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PREFACE 
This paper has been produced as part of IIASA's hazardous waste 
management work, which is the main component of the Institutional Set- 
tings and Environmental Policies project. The overall aim of this work, 
reflected in this paper, is to systematize our understanding of interac- 
tions between institutional. and technical factors in policy making and 
implementation. The influence of institutional processes upon technical 
knowledge built into policy has been increasingly recognized. However, 
it has yet to be adequately clarified in comparative research on different 
regulatory systems. Institutional structures canot be easily tran- 
splanted from one culture to another. Nevertheless, through the normal 
flux of policy, institutional development slowly occurs anyway, in more 
or less ad hoc fashion. Comparative insight may help to direct reflection 
and adaptation in more deliberate and constructive ways. 
This paper forms one draft chapter of an intended book on hazar- 
dous waste management. The reader will therefore notice references to 
other draft chapters in this study which are also being circulated 
separately, and which are available from lIASk A full list is given over- 
leaf. A t  this stage the papers are drafts, and are not intended for publi- 
cation in present form. They are being circulated for review and revi- 
sion. 
I would like to thank those policy makers and others who have 
exchanged papers and information with us, and those who generously 
gave of their time and experience in the many interviews which form a 
substantial input to this work. A full list of acknowledgements will even- 
tually be published. 
THE HUNGARUSN COLLABORATION 
This Hungarian case study was written by Ern5 Kiss, under the supervision 
of Dr. Pal Tarnas of the Institute of Sociology of the Hungarian Academy of Sci- 
ences. Assistance was also given by Drs. Janos Vecsenyi and Anna Vari of the 
Bureau of Systems Analysis of the Hungarian State Office of Technology. We are 
very grateful to these colleagues for their efforts and for hospitality during 
visits to Budapest. We are also grateful to D r  Istvan Kiss of the Bureau of Sys- 
tems Analysis and secretary to the Hungarian National Member Organization 
(NMO), for his encouragement and facilitation of cooperation. 
The research conducted by Ern6 Kiss consisted mainly of interviews with 
relevant policy makers (and associated documentation) according to a schedule 
first provided by and discussed with IIASA's INS group. The collaboration 
evolved during 1983 and early 1984 via a series of informal working meetings in 
Budapest and at IIASA so that coordination was maintained with other research. 
A first draft case study was produced in early 1984 and responses to further 
questions produced another in March 1984. A final meeting was held in April 
1984 at IIASA involving Dutch and Hungarian collaborators, leading to the 
present version of the case study. 
As leader of the hazardous waste research I gratefully achowledge the 
cooperation extended by Dr. G. Gonda, Director of the Hungarian State Office for 
Nature Conservation and Environmental Protection, and by his staff in the 
Hazardous Wastes Division, especially Dr. Attila Takacs, Deputy Director. 
Brian Wynne 
Research Leader 
Institutional Settings and 
Environmental Policies 
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HAZARDOUS WASI'E MANG- IN HUNGARY 
Erno Kiss 
A comprehensive program for modernizing industry was launched in Hun- 
gary after World War Two. At the end of the 1960s. this was followed by the 
intensive development of mechanized agriculture. As a result the industrial 
and agricultural infrastructure has developed considerably over the last 30 to 
35 years. The extensive development of the economy included tremendous 
growth in the chemical industry which increased production almost 34-fold 
over a 33-year period. This growth imposed increasing burdens on the environ- 
ment including a considerable expansion in the types and amounts of hazar- 
dous wastes being produced. Since the late 1960s the question of the environ- 
mental and health hazards from hazardous wastes, emanating primarily from 
the chemical industry, has become an important issue. 
Since the early 1970s, several cases of environmental pollution from hazar- 
dous wastes have been discovered. The first was the case of galvanic sludge 
produced by an automobile and truck works. I t  was found that heavy metal 
salts and cyanide had contaminated the subsoil and spread uncontrolled 
beneath a waste dump. In another case in Tatabdnya, cyanide leached from a 
waste dump into a nearby reservoir and was detected by health authorities. In 
other cases, arsenic contamination was reported in areas of the Danube and 
Tisza Rivers. This pollution resulted from the unsafe storage of a catalyst at  a 
chemical plant. In addition to these incidents studies on the harmful implica- 
tions of hazardous wastes from abroad, mainly from the United States and the 
Federal Republic of Germany, called attention to the issue. 
In 1971 the National Institute of Public Health* (OKI) decided to launch a 
study on industrial wastes. This study was carried out by ten provincial public 
health and epidemiological stations (KOJAL) with the voluntary cooperation of 
140 industrial companies selected as representative samples. (see Appendix for 
an organization chart of government bodies regulating hazardous waste). In 
assessing the data, the Ministry of Health elaborated guidelines for storing and 
treating wastes hazardous to the environment and human health. These guide- 
lines did not have the force of law but were recommendations for industry. 
Before the establishment in 1979 of the executive State Off-ice for Environ- 
mental Protection and Nature Conservation (OKTH), the Ministry of Health was 
the only authority with any responsibility relating to risk management from 
hazardous wastes. However its control was weak and indirect, since its main 
responsibility was general public health which focused its monitoring, research 
* Part of the Ministry of Health. See Appendix for an outline description of the relevant institutional 
mtructure. 
and control activities. Unless specific health problems were associated with an 
industry's waste management actions (as happened later a t  Vdc, see below), it 
had no mandate to examine industrial waste practices. Perhaps because it was 
not seen by the cooperating industries as a potential "policeman", OK1 was 
given good access to "internal" information. The "pilot" survey was followed up 
between 1978-80 with a much enlarged exercize covering 3,300 plants, involving 
20 regional KOJAts. This later study was performed in the context of proposed 
formal legislation and control, and some have suggested that this new climate 
created a relationship which reduced the accuracy of the data supplied. 
At least among the upper reaches of society, well-articulated awareness of 
environmental problems began as early as in other countries. In 1974 the 
Popular Patriotic Front held a well-attended, and publicized meeting on 
environmental problems from which led to several initiatives. Subsequently, 
environmental problems in general were addressed by high-level, comprehen- 
sive policy initiatives on environmental protection. This resulted in the enact- 
ment of Law n/1976 on the protection of the human environment. This law pro- 
vided the general framework for further legal regulations on environmental 
protection, but was not specific enough to act as a means of the effective regu- 
lation of hazardous waste disposal. 
Even after 1976 each producer still deposited and "disposed of wastes 
(some later classified as "hazardous" under the legislation) a t  their own discre- 
tion outside the premises of the company - unless the manner of disposal led 
to effects violating other public health regulations. Often such wastes were 
disposed of with municipal garbage or "stored" by the plant 
This lack of special treatment for hazardous wastes was due mainly to a 
lack of direct legislation giving authorization to inspect. Fundamentally, there 
was little planning, when designing industrial facilities, for the treatment and 
re-utilization of wastes produced. Only a small number of companies have 
invested in waste disposal technologies. For example, an oil refinery has volun- 
tarily built an industrial incinerator. In other cases, incinerators of smaller 
capacity were built by the Chinoin Pharmaceutical Works and the Nitrokdmia 
Chemical Works. However, apart from these sporadic examples, industrial- 
wastes of unknown quantity and composition appear to have been continuously 
deposited in the  environment, i.e., in ditches, gullies, and other dumping sites, 
including untreated waste dumps at industrial plants. 
Unsolved environmental problems and generally rising awareness contri- 
buted to the establishment, in 1977, of the National Council for Environmental 
Protection and Nature Conservation (OKTH). This was created by the Council of 
Ministers as an advisory body. In addition, a State Office (the executive body) 
for the National Council was also founded. In 1979, the State Office of the OKTH 
was granted sole authority for dealing with air pollution and for nature conser- 
vation, and shared responsibility, together with the Ministry of Health, for noise 
and hazardous wastes. 
Law 11/1976 on environmental protection, the basis for the foundation of 
the National Council for Environmental Protection and the State Off-ice, only 
very gradually provided a statutory framework for the regulation of industrial 
wastes. With the knowledge gained through its earlier survey, OK1 called atten- 
tion several times in the 1970s to the need for formal control of hazardous 
wastes. However these demands floundered for several reasons: the  relevant 
department of the Ministry of Health was being reorganized and anyway had 
only an indirect connection to the issue; there was only circumstantial scien- 
tific evidence of causal connections to local health problems; OKTH, although 
being planned, was not then in existence: and because the Industry Ministry was 
more concerned with problems of production. The Ministry that  guided and 
commissioned the second OK1 survey for example. was'not a Health or Environ- 
mental Ministry, but the Ministry for Housing and Town Development. However, 
in 1979, a disastrous situation arising from improper waste disposal ~ r f  the  
small Hungarian town of Vdc stimulated urgent action not only to deal with that  
specific problem, but with more general remedies as well. 
THE CASE OF 'lXE CHINOIN PIANT IN VAC 
The Chinoin Pharmaceutical Works, near Vdc, used one location for storing 
raw materials and by-products. But since 1952 on the company used i t  to also 
dispose of wastes. This disposal was performed partly in an open air burning pit 
and partly by landfill. In 1977 the county council and the local water authority 
outlawed both disposal practices. However, the accumulation of wastes contin- 
ued. By the spring of 1980 the huge pit had become full and was surrounded by 
approximately 12 thousand barrels of various toxic, flammable, and explosive 
chemicals. In addition, the barrels were not always sealed and most were 
unsuitable for transport. Through the  intervention of the then Ministry of 
Heavy Industries, a licence from the Ministry of Health was obtained for a one- 
time, open-air burning. This burning had to be interrupted, however, because 
of the  high level of air pollution indicated by measuring instruments located in 
the region. Burning was later continued, after some additional precautions 
were taken. 
Towards the end of the 1970s. in certain parts of Vdc the drinking water 
system became suddenly turbid. yellowish, and smelled of chemicals. Public 
concern was aroused throughout the town and it was publicized in the media. 
Numerous diseases with symptoms of vomiting and diarrhea occurred. Accord- 
ing to the county Department of Health approximately 20% of the population 
was affected. This situation continued for a long time with all initiatives to 
remedy the situation foundering in red-tape. Fmally, in several stages, a 
number of wells, primarily in the Vdc-South water basin, were closed and have 
not been reopenend since. The population began carrying drinking water from 
other sources. Many local inhabitants who worked in Budapest brought drinking 
water in cans there for their families. Naturally car owners had a distinct 
advantage, but car ownership is low. 
The Water Department and the Public Health Department received many 
queries about the quality of the water but responded that the drinking water 
was safe. Tbis was in fact true, according to Hungarian standards. One of the 
leaders of the county Public Health Department later admitted in a statement 
concerning the outbreak of disease that the reason for their reassuring replies 
to public concern was that  they did not want "to create a panic"! Despite this 
frankness, they admitted that wells had been closed. not because they caused 
disease, but because one standard requires that drinking water should not have 
any unusual taste or smell. 
Because of the contamination, more than one-third of the potable water 
supply for Vdc, G6d6llo and Dunakeszi, as well as for 14 other small communi- 
ties, temporarily ceased . The Institute for Water Quality Protection of the 
Water Management Research Center of the National Water Authority investi- 
gated the case. Results obtained from their analyses (using a modern mass 
spectrometer) showed that the materials contaminating the water were pri- 
marily various solvents (such as l-butanol, benzene, and toluene): The water 
samples, based on the groundwater flow, were taken from more than 20 obser- 
vation wells drilled especially for this purpose. Knowledge of the Chinoin plant 
and other pollution sources in the area made i t  certain that the bulk of con- 
tamination by solvents originated from the plant. Experiments conducted with 
small mammal and human blood cell cultures indicated detrimental liealth 
effects. 
Many relevant authorities, institutions, and responsible persons had been 
well aware for years of the possibility of the water being contaminated in Vdc, 
but no action was taken. Several weeks before the scandal broke, the Chinoin 
plant had already been cleaned up. The sudden disposal by burning had 
occurred not only because of the fear of adverse publicity. but because the 
Council of Ministers decided to make a government committee and its chair- 
man personally responsible for remedying the uncontrolled dumping that had 
been going on. The public 'scandal had engendered the creation of an ad hoc 
decision structure which cut clean through the normal bureaucratic complex- 
ity. 
HWWlOUS WASl'E USISATION 
In part as a result of the Vdc scandal, in 1980 the State Office of the OKTH 
started to develop more precise legislation for addressing the problem of hazar- 
dous wastes, a t  that time still undefined. This legislation was prepared by the 
Department of Environmental Protection of the State Office in cooperation with 
experts appointed by the Ministry of Health, which had conducted the two waste 
auweys had extende'd their earlier waste survey into a second, much larger 
study. The basis for this collaboration was provided by an order of the Council of 
Ministers. This conferred the responsibility for dealing with toxic chemicals in 
the environment on the National Institute for Public Health (OW) and on the  
local public health departments (KOJAL). In November 1981 a law was passed by 
the Council of Ministers to deal with hazardous wastes. This became known as 
the "Initial Order." 
First of all, the group drafting the legislation attempted to define the con- 
cept of hazardous wastes. However, because this concept is difficult to  define, 
lists of chemical compounds vary greatly from country to country (see Dowling 
and Linnerooth, in this volume). Therefore the Initial Order gave a general 
definition, but did not specify the properties and tests which would define 
hazardous wastes per se; instead a list was compiled containing various kinds of 
wastes deemed to  be hazardous, and this was included as an appendix of the 
order. This list drew heavily from lists compiled in the Federal Republic of Ger- 
many. It was put together by waste experts in the Department for Environmen- 
tal Protection of the OKTH. Informal contacts with experts in other Ministries 
such as Public Health were also used, and their analysis of the 197880 survey 
data also acted as an input to the regulations. These included specific norms 
(not yet enacted) for proper treatment of given wastes. 
A draft of the order was circulated among the ministries and state authori- 
ties concerned and a compromise order was worked out. There were some 
objections by the Ministry of Industry concerning the timing of the order. As in 
other countries, they wanted to develop a treatment and disposal facility net- 
work before control legislation was imposed but were overruled. 
In addition to governmental circulation, the initial draft was discussed in 
public. including discussions with companies. trade unions, scientific commit- 
tees, committees of the Union of Technical and Scientific Associations, and by 
the organizations of the Patriotic Popular Front. However, according to the law 
on governmental circulation, only the opinions of other government agencies 
had to be considered; the opinions of public interest groups did not need to be 
considered, 
An unexpected reaction of the companies aoncerned was a general sense of 
relief, because a t  least the order eliminated a highly uncertain situation. They 
did complain, however, that their adrninistrative burdens would increase with 
the compulsory reporting of their hazardous wastes, and that they would face 
additional costs in connection with the legally required storage and neutraliza- 
tion of hazardous wastes. Nevertheless, the Initial Order was put into force on 
January 1. 1982. 
The Initial Order was supplemented by executive instructions by the Minis- 
tries of Industry. Agriculture. Building, Transportation, Finance, and Defense. 
In addition, a regulation issued by the State Office gave a formula for calculat- 
ing the penalty for offenses under the hazardous wastes law. This formula took 
into consideration the nature of the violation, amount of waste, and its hazard 
classification. The primary aim of the penalty was not to  provide income for 
the budget (although the penalties are paid into the account of the  Central 
Environmental Protection Fund) but to influence the companies involved The 
increased expenses of improperly disposing of wastes and thereby polluting and 
endangering the environment, i t  was hoped. would force the companies to com- 
ply with the regulations and to modify their processes or develop technologies 
for recycling wastes. Therefore. the order and its penalties were viewed not as 
punishments but as incentives. 
The first penalty actually imposed was in 1983. Most penalties are appealed 
by the companies, and the legal procedure up to the time of actual payment of 
the penalty is quite lengthy. Based on the present data a total of 160 million 
forints have been assigned in 129 cases but only 80 million forints have been 
collected. (For comparison. in 1982 a total of 210 million forints in penalties 
for air pollution were paid.)* 
There are some legal loopholes which make implementation of the order 
impossible in special situations. For example: 
1) The order does not apply to non-profit organizations or to very small, 
for-profit ones. 
2) The sewage sludge of communal sewage plants is not regarded as a 
hazardous waste (although this is often hazardous). 
3) The order stipulates that, in case of a direct and serious danger to the 
environment, environmental protection authorities can stop the 
activity producing the hazardous waste. However. the ministry con- 
trolling the waste-producing company may cancel such an order for 
economic reasons. 
Besides these legal loopholes. the small number of the environmental protec- 
tion staff may also reduce the chances of implementing the order. There are 
18,000 potentially hazardous waste-producing plants in Hungary, and there are 
only about 30 to 35 inspectors. For example, in the region of Budapest alone , 
there are about .7,000 potentially hazardous waste-producing plants, but only 
three inspectors. With this ratio, given even inspection, a given waste- 
* 1 million forint = approximately 24,000 US dollars 
producing site can be personally inspected by one of the inspectors only once 
every 11 years! 
In addition to the above problems, the correction and extension of the list 
of hazardous wastes is also an important question. I t  is obvious that  structural 
changes of the economy and technological development are likely to produce 
additional hazardous wastes not included previously in the initial list. There- 
fore, the initial order requires that  each new industrial waste be regarded a s  
hazardous until declared non-hazardous. Most other countries list properties 
and tests which define a waste as hazardous and thus "listed" for regulation. 
The waste producer is responsible for such tests. In Hungary a company which 
produces a new waste can apply for an exemption from the hazardous waste 
regulations. The Department of Public Health must then test the waste to 
either place i t  in one of their three categories of hazard in the list or exempt it. 
FInal decisions are  made by the OKTH and Ministry of Health. The tests include 
measurement of pH, oxygen demand, flammability, solubility, heavy metal con- 
centration. organic solvent content, and microbiological tests. 
The Initial Order regulates four main issues: (1) inspection of waste pro- 
duction, (2) storage, (3) neutralization, and (4) ways of directly preventing 
environmental pollution. 
~ C I ' X O N  AND RECORDING OF HAZARDOUS WASI'E PRODUCTION 
According to  the Initial Order, each generator of hazardous waste must 
complete a questionnaire form giving both the daily and annual amount pro- 
duced and the, method of collection, storage, pretreatment, and neutralization 
of their hazardous wastes. The data required to be reported were selected so 
as to meet what the State Office defined as the the "minimum" information 
needed to  protect the environment. The aim behind the  data-definition is a 
complete materials-balance of the processes involved. This is in practice a very 
detailed data exercise if properly conducted. The questionnaire contains over 
100 different questions. For example, companies are  required to  detail which 
section of their plant give rise to which particular wastes. and an associated 
"technology tree" describing the plant and process must  be submitted with the  
waste details. 
The data will eventually be stored in a computer in the  Institute for 
Environmental Protection. The completed forms are controlled by the local 
inspectorates of the State Office, by the local stations of the  Institute, and 
finally, when needed, by the Department of Wastes of the Institute. "Control" 
here means mainly a "desk evaluation" of the plausibility of the data provided. 
On occasion, however, inspectors conduct random on-site examinations, check 
the methods of storage, and ask companies to provide accountings of 
materials-balances and the full amount of the waste reported. These inspectors 
are chemical engineers, all of whom have a t  least a general knowledge of the  
process involved but many have an extensive knowledge. Inaccuracies are  
caused by the  fact that  the  companies are not familiar with methods for con- 
ducting a waste-oriented materials balance, with the consequence that  the data 
are  in many cases distorted. 
To date some 60% of hazardous waste generators have sent in more or less 
adequately filled in forms. These, however, had to be repeatedly queried and 
checked. So far, only about 50% to 80% of the reported data (i.e., 30%-36% of 
overall) can be considered complete and produced to be processed by the com- 
puter. The reliability of the data to be processed by computer is influenced by 
several factors. The most important of these are: 
(1) In the companies which produce the majority (according to some esti- 
mates, about 70%) of hazardous wastes, the accounting for materials 
and technological descriptions of processes usually are focused on 
end-products, so that the kind and quantity of the wastes produced 
often cannot be identified. Usually, only subjective estimates are pro- 
vided. subjective. 
(2) In case of sludges. which are a very common physical form, wastes 
contain a variable proportion of water and only the solid portion is 
dangerous. This water content, which may be as high as 90%-97%, can- 
not be determined accurately. 
(3) Variations in production processes due to normal fluctuations in con- 
ditions. management. and workforce practices. etc., cause waste 
volumes and compositions to vary uncontrollably within surprisingly 
wide limits. 
(4) Producers do not always continuously record production levels. Often 
the records are made on a quarterly basis, so knowledge of any short- 
term changes is hidden. 
In order t o  increase the reliability of the data reported, the State Office 
intends. in the future, to influence the Ministry of Finance to change its 
accounting method, so that  the kinds and quantity of wastes produced are also 
recorded. 
Records are kept not only by the  State Office, but also by the  Inspectorate 
of Chemical and Explosive Materials of by the Ministry of Industry. This Inspec- 
torate conducted a separate study of a limited sample of hazardous waste pro- 
ducers between 1970-00. This study included 870 sites of 337 firms. The data 
included origin of the waste, amount and type of waste, and a description of its 
chemical properties. This description included solid content, water content, 
flammability, toxicity, solubility, etc. This survey identified 210-220.000 tons 
of hazardous waste disposed of annually by deposition and 130-140.000 tons 
incinerated. 
Hazardous wastes produced in Hungary that are not recorded accurately 
by \he various surveys can be divided into four categories: 
1. Hazardous wastes which are produced in such large quantities that  
they were simply omitted from the list in the Initial Order on prag- 
matic grounds. These include such wastes as red mud produced by 
smelting of aluminum, and mineral sludges. 
2. Hazardous wastes which are processed by specialized companies, e.g.. 
animal proteins. 
3. Hazardous wastes which are burned in small-capacity incinerators of 
the waste generators, neutralized chemically, bound by special pro- 
cedures, e.g., embedded in bitumen or ash, are transported abroad for 
incineration. or recycled for use in production. 
4. Particularly hazardous wastes "temporarily stored" by the waste gen- 
erators. (In fact the distinction between "temporarily stored" and 
"deposited" is extremely difficult to make.) 
In order to improve centralized control of hazardous waste disposal. the State 
Office of the OKTH has submitted a proposal to  the State Committee for Plan- 
ning recommending the establishment of a country-wide network for treating 
hazardous wastes. 
- 15- 
A NATIONAL IUEW0R.K OF T R E A W  AND DISPOSAL FACILITIES 
In 1980, the State Office of the  OKTH commissioned the Institute for 
Environmental Protection to design a network of treatment and disposal facili- 
ties bearing in mind the existing data on waste generation. The design was 
completed in 1980 and included plans for constructing five incinerators and 
designating eight new landfill locations. In discussions submitting the propos4 
the President of the State Office of the  OKTH and the Minister of Industry 
reached an agreement. Because the  majority of hazardous wastes are produced 
by the industry, the Ministry of Industry was put in charge of organizing and 
financing the national network. Hungarian law follows the same principle as in 
western countries, that  the producer is responsible for the waste it  generates. 
The Inspectorate for Chemicals and Explosive Materials of the Ministry of Indus- 
try was charged with this work. In 1982, the State Committee for Planning 
approved the establishment of the country-wide treatment and disposal network 
although responsibility tor its financing remained a problem to be negotiated. 
In 1983, the State Office of the OKTH set the technical standards for treatment 
and storage of hazardous wastes. 
In establishing this network several difficulties have arisen: 
1. In Hungary, there are very few geologically and morphologically suit- 
able areas for landfills. Most of the country is covered by porous sedi- 
mentary rocks. There are only a few argilaceous regions with low 
rates of permeability. In addition, there are no abandoned salt mines 
such as those in the FRG, which could be used as controlled dumping 
grounds. Ftfty-one potential locations were tested by geologists, and 
only a limited number were found to be suitable. 
2. The regions found to be suitable are being subjected to detailed geo- 
logical examinations. If approved, the institute responsible for the 
investment must apply to the county council for permission to use the 
location. However, a t  this level there have been serious difficulties. 
County officials t ry  to avoid. in all possible ways. the establishment of 
what have been called "poison cemeteries" in their area. for the  sim- 
ple reason that they are  afraid of losing their popularity. People are 
afraid of "poison cemete r iks~~  because in previous years, media debate 
and official prevarication has created confusion in connection with 
the water contamination in Vdc. "Dangerous" wastes have evoked 
uncertainty and fear in the  man-on-the-street. This particular issue is 
very prominant in public perceptions of environmental risks in Hun- 
gary - 
3. Present economic difficulties in Hungary do not favor the establish- 
ment of a capital-intensive network which puts a heavy burden on 
available resources. This situation is aggravated by additional cir- 
cumstances. I t  has already become evident in the design phase 
currently underway tha t  the main units of the incinerators can be 
acquired only by import from western countries. Funds for establish- 
i q  what is essentially a pollution control network can only be pro- 
vided from financial sources normally used for technological develop 
ment. There is, therefore, direct competition, in the very same 
budget, between funds for new production technologies. which might 
entail reduced wastes, and clean-up technologies t o  manage wastes 
from existing technologies. Furthermore, because of peculiarities of 
investment in Hungary, parts of the proposed network are relatively 
more expensive than is the case of a foreign establishment of similar 
capacity. For example, in the FRG a landfill with a capacity of 70,000 
tons per year could be operated by a staff of five. while one designed in 
Hungary would require 50 to 60 persons. 
4. Management of the waste plants is to be carried out by a consortia of 
I 
waste producer industries helping to finance the plant afid plant cus- 
tomers, and local authorities. However, industrial companies i i  Hun- 
gary cannot be forced to invest in the waste treatment network 
Therefore, there is no state-enforceable guarantee of industry partici- 
pation and financial investment. Also, the State agencies involved 
have taken a long time negotiating their proportional responsibilities 
for capital financial input. The overall uncertainty has led to  cut- 
backs in the planned network, even though this will mean a shortfall 
of treatment and disposal facility supply in relation to demand. 
Some of these difficulties will be illustrated by the following case study. 
Ihs S t i n g  of a Landfill in Zsdmb &k 
The relevant county council agreed t o  geological investigations in the  
vicinity of the village Zsdmbdk, in the county of Pest, in an area deemed to be 
suitable for a hazardous waste landfill. A layer of clay was found in one section 
of the  area. which with respect to  both its permeability and size. is the geologi- 
cally most suitable site in Hungary. 
The population was officially informed by the local council of its intention 
t o  establish a "poison cemetery." The population was afraid (partially due to 
prevailing confusion surrounding the earlier Vdc scandal) that  its drinking 
water would become contaminated. and began to protest against the establish- 
ment of the site. 
Further examinations have proved that  although the clay layer naturally 
has a sealing effect, the groundwater flow under the clay is not directed 
towards the village. In addition, the water supply of the village will soon be pro- 
vided from the Karst Water Basin in the course of a coal mining program to be 
cpmpleted in the near future. Nevertheless, the protests continued. and the 
county council therefore decided to deny the licence for the  site. When the 
president of the OKTH personally exerted pressure on the county, they "mobil- 
ized" the parliamentary representative of the ZshbBk district. who interceded 
with the Minister of Housing and Public Construction. He argued successfully 
that if the proposal resulted in such social unrest. a suitable clay layer should 
be sought elsewhere. At that  time, the specialists of the OKTH were confident 
that they would find another clay-layered site and they did not push to keep the 
site in Z s h b d k  open through other government processes. However, an alter- 
native site is yet to be located. Today they regret this decision. 
T'lim c- SITUATION 
Because of these difficulties, the planned size of the national network has 
been reduced. From five incinerators and eight landfills, the State Committee 
for Planning now hopes to establish one incinerator and three landfills. In 
February 1984, the  situation is as follows: 
1. The network is designed to contain an incinerator with a capacity of 
30,000 tons per year and three landfills with a total capacity of 40,000 
tons per year. These would be established and operated by an associa- 
tion of 178 companies concerned. 
2. Forty-five percent of the investment costs would be provided by the  
companies, fifty percent by loans, and the remainder froth Lhe Central 
Fund for Environmental Protection of the State Bank for Industrial 
Development. 
3. However, even these greatly reduced estimates of investment costs 
are twice as large as the available resources. These estimates are also 
highly uncertain, since no final decisions have been made as to the  
actual technology for the  incinerator or the landfills. 
4. According to  the current  - but still not final - plans, the first landfill 
would start operation in 1986-87,' the second one in 1987, and the  
third in 1988. while the incinerator would s tar t  in 1988-89. 
5. This reduced capacity network. will not be accepted as final by the  
State Office of the OKTH. I t  will still insist on eventually establishing 
the entire network (of eight landfills and three incinerators). They 
interpret the present plan as only a first phase. 
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APPENDIX. THE OVERALL INSlTWTIONAL SYSI'EH HIR CONTROL OF HAZARDOUS WASPg 
The following diagram outlines the various administrative bodes in Hun- 
gary responsible for hazardous waste management and their relationships. 
The Regional Inspectorates for Environmental Protection and Nature Con- 
servation. responsible in the first instance for checking the fulfilment of the 
Initial Order, naturally give their ,attention to the local environment and com- 
munities. In the case of hazardous waste regulation they monitor more directly 
the waste producers than environmental media. 
The longer-established Regional Services for Public Health and Epidemiol- 
ogy are authorised less directly to check the waste producers. However, their 
primary task in relation to hazardous wastes is to conduct initial official exami- 
nations. of environmental areas and communities found to be contaminated 
with hazardous wastes. The two regional services cooperate, if not officially in 
many cases in a concrete way. The effectiveness of this cooperation however, is 
primaily a function of the personal relations between the local workers of the 
parallel regional services. There appears to be little conflict or competition 
between these regulatory arms. and this loose-knit, informal collaboration 
creates no extra problems for waste producers. 
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COMMENTAKY 
by 
Brian W y n n e  
From the perspective of the  IIASA comparative project, the following points 
are the most interesting about the Hungarian case: 
1. When one looks at  the  evolution of the public issue and the first phase of 
policy making, namely legislation, one finds that Hungary is little different 
from Western countries - indeed many hazard criteria and other norms have 
been more or less directly exchanged. e.g.. from the  FRG, and used in the Hun- 
garian legislation. 
However. the national institutional relationships between industry and 
government have a direct effect upon the implementability of legislation. Hun- 
garian industry is centrally planned and financially supported in certain ways, 
and especially in the larger industries there is no market competition. How- 
ever, there is no central State dictation to industry, which is remarkably free to 
manage its own affairs. Thus industry may, for example. choose not to partici- 
pate in the planned waste treatment and disposal infrastructure which is meant 
to be consortially financed and run. It is even free t o  export wastes. so long as i t  
has the collateral business to  pay the necessary foreign currency. Note that  
this is a less restrictive framework than those in Hesse, Bavaria, and Denmark. 
There are of course economic incentives which are designed to encourage 
participation. and good waste .management practice generally; examples are 
higher charges for customers who do not invest in the planned network's treat- 
ment and disposal plants, and the fines system. In theory, excessive fines 
should make it optimal for an industry to decide instead to pay less money to 
be a part-financer of the infrastructure. or at least pay to be a customer of 
proper facilites. However the  fines and incentives appear to be ineffective as a 
means of tightening up waste disposal. This is so because lack of competition, 
established state support, and the national commitment to avoid unemploy- 
ment together mean that  an industry might get away with paying fines for lax 
waste mangement to one state agency, whilst obtaining a subsidy to avoid ban- 
kruptcy from another. It is difficult to gauge the true extent to which this h a p  
pens, but existing institutional arrangements (which may of course be defensi- 
ble on wider grounds) appear to allow it. 
Overall therefore, there is the paradox that  this centrally planned econ- 
omy has little instif.lltiond resources to implement an urgently necessary 
national treatment and disposal infrastructure. There is no guarantee that  
industry will use and thus protect the viability of the infrastructural invest- 
ment once in place. This institutional problem interacts with and exacerbates 
already-severe investment capital shortages. 
2. The various potential points for regulation delineated in the schema dis- 
cussed in chapter two were a s  follows: 
industrial production 
waste generation 
transport 
treatment 
disposal 
The Hungarian system of regulation places its weight upon the first two. 
The reason for this is that, as a centrally planned economy. it already has the 
institutional arrangements and accepted cultural practices which allow easy 
state agency access to "internal" industrial process data. Western economies, 
on the other hand, have no such traditions, indeed they have dominant cultural 
values and entrenched interests which maintain the norm that such information 
is private property in a competitive environment. I t  is argued, largely 
successfully, to be a sacred industrial right to maintain this privacy. 
The comparative situation is therefore as depicted here: 
/ \ 
Hungarian Western Economies' 
Regulatory Regulatory 
Emphasis Emphasis 
The disadvantages of the typical western situation were discussed previ- 
ously, namely that  the most important, widely-agreed-to as necessary mode of 
regulation. (moving towards less waste-producing processes or technologies. at  
least controlling the composition of wastes which are unavoidable, and 
encouraging recycling) is the least accessible to regulation. The Hungarian 
institutional arrangements in principle overcome this problem. but in practice 
the financial resources needed to convert the information a t  this level into 
actual regulatory effects are in very short supply. Nevertheless, the system 
focuses attention at  this more strategic point. even to the extent that there is 
no transport trip-ticket system in Hungary, and indeed very little transporta- 
tion of hazardous wastes goes on. Most is "s tored or treated on-site. 
The data compilation on production technology-trees, material balances, 
and waste outputs may in the end be less accurate than its elaborate frame- 
work suggests. Nevertheless, it  appears that  once it  is available in computer- 
ized form, it will for the reasons already given, be better than corresponding 
data fr:. ,. most if not all other countries. Furthermore, a very real extra bene- 
fit may lie in the indirect effect of the data gathering, in that  it  makes indus- 
trial managers more sensitive to the waste dimension in design, planning and 
routine decisions, via the  very exercise of producing such detailed data for the 
regulators. 
3. The Hungarian case Seems to substantiate the view expressed in our 
work. that there are significantly different strategic definitions of hazardous 
waste management as a policy issue. In Hungary there seem to have been no 
scientific debates about specific risks of given compounds and wastes, and little 
formal risk analysis. The risk estimates implicit in other countries' hazard 
lists have been adopted, and government scientists have used informal judg- 
ment to decide whether waste descriptions from the industrial data surveys 
qualified the waste as a listed waste. These judgments have not been subject to 
formal review or justification. The problems of developing an industrial infras- 
tructure have been more pressing than the need to formalize and refine a risk 
assessment regulatory approach 
4. In Hungary as elsewhere, public concern and media debate about 
environmental risks is a very significant element in policy implementation, 
especially over siting. Although the  economy may in some respects be less 
highly developed than many western countries, education is widespread and the 
culture is sophisticated and articulate, with a strong tradition of independent 
journalism to sustain this. 
The question of social attitudes and policy implementation is discussed in 
the final chapter of this study. It is clear from this case history (particularly 
the Vdc situation) that in Hungary, as elsewhere, public outcry created more 
effect and cut more bureaucratic knots more rapidly than the patient, intra- 
governmental efforts of the public health Institute (OKI). 
5. One especially interesting comparative issue is the experience of the 
relevant state agencies in conducting the necessary (informal and public) bar- 
gaining, both "internally" between different state and industrial interests, and 
"externally" with local authorities and public groups. For example, responsible 
regulatory agencies in different countries vary with respect to the f o m a l  
powers and constraints which affect the implementability of regulation policies. 
But they vary in their infoma1 constraints too. If serious international agree- 
ments on harmonizing waste mangement regulations were ever achieved, such 
comparative institutional understanding would become especially important in 
order to have a realistic appreciation of the likelihood of actually implementing 
consistent regulations rather than merely paying lip service to the ideals. 
6. One point which emerges from the Hungarian case is that  centrally 
planned systems cannot necessarily overcome the institutional realities of 
inter-departmental fragmentation much better than others can. For example, 
for arbitrary reasons, issues as propagated by bodies (such as the KOJAL's of OKI 
pushing hazardous wastes as a probem), often fall between the attention frame- 
works of bodies which might put them clearly on the policy agenda. As the Hun- 
garian case study describes, the relevant department of the Ministry of Health 
was being reorganized when the scientists and local inspectorates began 
demanding policy attention for hazardous waste control. .The OKTH was only just 
coming into being - "everywhere there were new faces, new roles, new peopleH* - 
and no effective attention. Interest and responsibility fell between, ra ther  than 
upon, the Health. Housing, and Industry Ministries and their various Institutes, 
to the extent that they performed different surveys of waste arisings when they 
needed such data. Thus the Institute of Chemicals and Explosives performed a 
further survey for the Industry Ministry over and above OKl's, when the Ministry 
of Industry became involved in the planning of the national treatment and 
disposal infrastructure. 
I t  appears that it was mainly locally generated concern from the inspector- 
ates, and public scandal generated by the Vdc issue. which created the impetus 
for policy action leading to the 1981 Order. This has been undermined by the 
delays in the plan for the national treatment and disposai network A new 
round of implementation problems has begun, dissipating the original impetus 
towards effective policy management. 
In order to make further advances much would now seem to  depend upon 
the ability of the relatively young bureaucracy of OKTH to negotiate and bar- 
gain within and outside government, and upon the strength and clarity of p u b  
Lic opinion on the need for national control, (which means a t  least the national 
treatment and disposal network). It may well be that a scientific risk-benefit 
assessment approach will come to  the fore to justify different positions in the 
severe competition for state resources that will figure centrally in the next 
phase of the issue 
* Comment by h a 6  Kiss 
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